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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the rise in popularity of a genre of You-
Tube videos known as “reaction videos” has resulted in controversy
for various reasons. The United States District Court in Hosseinzadeh
v. Klein, a landmark case for the genre, described the “reaction
videos” as “a large genre of YouTube videos . . . [that] vary widely in
terms of purpose, structure, and the extent to which they rely on po-
tentially copyrighted material.”1 According to the Hosseinzadeh opin-
ion, “[s]ome reaction videos. . .intersperse short segments of another’s
work with criticism and commentary, while others are more akin to a
group viewing session without commentary.”2 Essentially, reaction
videos are exactly what the name suggests: a video showing a person
or group of people reacting to the work of another, which by nature
† Gretchen Liljeberg Casey is a J.D. Candidate at Loyola College of Law in
New Orleans. She would like to express her gratitude to Texas A&M for presenting
this opportunity for publication. She would also like to thank her father, Judge Hans
Liljeberg, for convincing her to go to law school, and her husband, Chris Casey, for
his encouragement and support.
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requires the incorporation of the work being reacted to for the
viewer’s reference.
The first time that controversy arose out of the “reaction” genre
was in 2015 when the Fine Brothers, the creators of a popular You-
Tube channel known for its “Kids React” series along with several
other “reaction video” series, applied to trademark the term “react.”3
The brothers did so with the intention to create a program called “Re-
act World,” through which they would license out the “reaction video”
format to other video creators.4 This endeavor came not long after the
Fine Brothers criticized Ellen DeGeneres for allegedly using their “re-
action” format in a segment on her television show, suggesting the
brothers’ belief that they were the sole owners of what is, in reality, a
widely-used format.5 As a result, YouTube viewers became distrustful
of the Fine Brothers’ intentions in trademarking the format, and view-
ers criticized them to the point that they issued a public apology in
February of 2016 in which they announced their decision to “[r]escind
all. . .‘React’ trademarks and applications” and “[d]iscontinue the Re-
act World program.”6
Later in 2016, reaction videos would again become the subject of
controversy when Ethan and Hila Klein, the husband-and-wife cre-
ators of the popular YouTube comedy channel H3H3 Productions,
were sued by Matt Hosseinzadeh of the decidedly less popular You-
Tube channel, Matt Hoss Zone, for copyright infringement.7 Hos-
seinzadeh alleged copyright infringement for the use of segments of
his video, “Bold Guy vs. Parkour Girl,” in a humorous reaction video
made by the Kleins.8 What resulted was the aforementioned Hos-
seinzadeh v. Klein opinion, which set a precedent that will hopefully
allow future reaction video creators to produce and share content
without their creativity being stifled by the looming risk of copyright
infringement lawsuits.
Hosseinzadeh alleged that a video, which was part of a series of
videos, starring himself as “Bold Guy,” “in which the Bold Guy flirts
with a woman and chases her through various sequences” was in-
fringement.9 Hosseinzadeh alleged that the Kleins’ video entitled
“The Big, The BOLD, The Beautiful,” infringed upon “Bold Guy vs.
3. Chris Foxx, Fine Brothers Spark Fury with YouTube Trademark Attempt, BBC




6. Benny Fine & Rafi Fine, A Message from the Fine Brothers, MEDIUM (Feb. 1,
2016), https://medium.com/@FineBrothersEnt/a-message-from-the-fine-brothers-a18e
f9b31777 [https://perma.cc/38MY-UWTR].
7. Cecilia D’Anastasio, H3H3 Productions Wins Lawsuit Filed By YouTuber
They Made Fun Of, KOTAKU (Aug. 24, 2017), https://kotaku.com/h3h3-productions-
win-lawsuit-against-youtuber-they-paro-1798386207 [https://perma.cc/3A8Y-HPQ5].
8. Id.
9. Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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Parkour Girl,” as it featured the couple “comment[ing] on and
criticiz[ing] [his] video, playing portions of it in the process.”10 Ac-
cepting the Kleins’ motion for summary judgment, which pleaded the
fair use defense, the court held that its “review of the. . .videos makes
it clear that [the claim] in which plaintiff alleges that defendants in-
fringed plaintiff’s copyrights, must be decided in defendants’ favor.”11
II. FAIR USE EXPLAINED
A. Origin of the Fair Use Doctrine
The use of copyrighted works to create new works is far from a
novel concept. For example, many of Beethoven’s early symphonies
copied the works of Mozart.12 It naturally follows that the fair use
doctrine was recognized in jurisprudence long before achieving fed-
eral statutory recognition.13 As the Supreme Court stated in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., “[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection,
some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been
thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”14 America’s history of recogniz-
ing the fair use doctrine echoes that of the early English courts, which
decided whether the use of a work was fair based on the question of
“whether [defendant’s work] is a legitimate use of the plaintiff’s publi-
cation, in the fair exercise of a mental operation, deserving the charac-
ter of an original work.”15 Among the first of such works English law
recognized as legitimate were unauthorized abridgments, as English
courts believed these works could be used “for the promotion of sci-
ence, and the benefit of the public.”16
The United States Supreme Court opinion established the jurispru-
dence upon which the fair use statute was based arose from Folsom v.
Marsh. In that opinion, Justice Story suggested that to determine fair
use, courts must “look to the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or super-
sede the objects, of the original work.”17 Justice Story’s summary of
fair use “remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage
10. Id.
11. Id. at 45.
12. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:1.60 (2018) [hereinafter
PATRY].
13. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
(“[A]lthough the First Congress enacted our initial copyright statute. . .without any
explicit reference to ‘fair use,’ as it later came to be known, the doctrine was recog-
nized by the American courts nonetheless”).
14. Id. at 575 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl.8).
15. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:1.60.
16. Id. (quoting 4 Esp. 168, 170 (1803)).
17. Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1170 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No.
4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841)).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR306.txt unknown Seq: 4 15-APR-19 14:28
604 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
of the 1976 Copyright Act,” and Section 107 clearly derives from the
Folsom opinion.18 Congress intended for this statute to “restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge
it in any way.”19
B. Purpose of Fair Use Doctrine
As suggested by the remarks of the English Common-law courts,
the purpose of the fair use doctrine, and specifically Section 107 of the
1976 Copyright Act, is to “[permit] courts to avoid rigid application of
the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very crea-
tivity which that law is designed to foster.”20 Accordingly, in each case
where a court must decide whether the use of a copyrighted work is
permissible, “the assessment is driven by whether the claimed fair use
furthers the goals of copyright.”21 Without the fair use doctrine, copy-
right law would prohibit the quoting of books in book reviews; the use
of photographs and film clips in news stories; and, as attempted by the
plaintiff in Hosseinzadeh, the creation of parodies and satires.22 It
could even be argued that if the law did not allow some amount of use
of copyrighted work, there could be no creation of new works at all. In
his article Toward a Fair Use Standard, Hon. Pierre N. Leval de-
scribed fair use as “a necessary part of the overall design” of the copy-
right monopoly and gave the following two reasons for allowing fair
use:
First, all intellectual creative activity is in part derivative. There is
no such thing as a wholly original thought or invention. Each ad-
vance stand on building blocks fashioned by prior thinkers. Second,
important areas of intellectual activity are explicitly referential. Phi-
losophy, criticism, history, and even the natural sciences require
continuous reexamination of yesterday’s theses.23
Thus, the purpose of the fair use doctrine is to facilitate the very
purpose of copyright law: to foster creation. As the Kleins implied in
their video response to Hosseinzadeh’s lawsuit, if courts fail to recog-
nize certain fair uses of copyrighted works (in their case in the form of
“reaction videos”), it would not only end their careers, but the careers
of many others who contribute to our culture today by posting crea-
tive videos online.24 It was for this reason that the Kleins later as-
serted the Hosseinzadeh court’s ruling in their favor made it a
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 p. 66 (1976)).
20. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:1.60.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1109–10 (1990).
24. We’re Being Sued, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fEGVOys
bC8w&t=683s (last visited June 14, 2018).
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“landmark case” by setting a precedent that would “strengthen fair
use across YouTube.”25
C. The Fair Use Defense in Practice
Frequently, the jury decides whether a fair use exists, although
when appropriate “it may be decided on summary judgment.”26 The
statute phrases fair use as an affirmative defense, which has been con-
firmed by the Supreme Court in multiple cases.27 The result of plead-
ing the fair use defense is that the plaintiff is given a slight evidentiary
burden.28 The majority of courts assess the defense by evaluating the
four factors enumerated in Section 107, taking any evidence brought
into account, and then finally weighing the factors together.29
III. STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF FAIR USE
The inclusion of the fair use doctrine in the 1967 Copyright Act is
best referred to as a “statutory recognition” rather than a “codifica-
tion” of the doctrine because “courts are not to regard Section 107 as
defining, encapsulating, or limiting fair use, but only as referencing
some factors to be examined using common-law methodology.”30 The
aforementioned Section 107, entitled “Limitations on exclusive rights:
Fair use,” provides that the fair use of copyrighted works, including
their reproductions by any other means, is not copyright infringement
(unless Sections 106 or 106A apply. According to Section 107, this is
the case, for any purposes such as criticism, commentary, journalism,
education, scholarship, or research. Section 107 provides four factors
to apply in any particular case to determine whether one’s use of a
copyrighted work is fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.31
An unpublished work is not barred from fair use if such a finding is
based on these four factors.32 The purpose of the statute’s preamble is
25. We Won the Lawsuit!, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9eN0CIy
F2ok (last visited June 14, 2018).
26. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:3.
27. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:2.
28. Id.
29. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:157.
30. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:8.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
32. Id.
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to “enumerat[e] illustrative methods of reproduction,” and purposes
they could be applied to.33 The six purposes enumerated in the pream-
ble are examples of works that may be considered fair use; the list is
not exclusive, but “conversely, uses that are enumerated within the
preamble are not presumptively fair.”34 The preamble as a whole is
most closely related to the first fair use factor and is best understood
in relation to that factor.35
Its drafters intended Section 107’s four factors to be analyzed to-
gether and “in light of the purposes of copyright.”36 In other words,
the factors “do not represent a score card that promises victory to the
winner of the majority.” Instead, they “direct courts to examine the
issue from every pertinent corner and to ask in each case whether, and
how powerfully, a finding of fair use would serve or disserve the
objectives of the copyright.”37 Though the majority of courts use the
four factors listed in Section 107 as guidance in fair use inquiries, these
factors “are not binding, need not be applied, and are not . . . discrete
inquiries;” they are “merely an attempt to note the considerations pre-
viously taken into account by courts operating under prior statutes . . .
that did not statutorily recognize fair use.”38 Some courts instead em-
ploy a common law analysis,39 but most engage in an “aggregate as-
sessment” of the factors.40 In doing so, courts must keep in mind that
the fair use inquiry is “open-ended and context-sensitive” and there-
fore “calls for case-by-case analysis.”41
IV. THE FAIR USE FACTORS AND REACTION VIDEOS
A. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor derives from the Folsom Court’s reference to “the
nature and objects of the selections made.”42 This factor “raises the
question of justification”—not only “whether or not justification ex-
ists” for the use, but “how powerful, or persuasive, is the justifica-
tion.”43 Though not determinative, courts consider this as the most
important factor, describing it as “the soul of fair use” and the “heart
33. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:12.
34. Id. at 1–2.
35. Id. at 1, 3.
36. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
37. Leval, supra note 23, at 1110–11.
38. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:8.
39. See Ty Publ’ns, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (Court
examined the use based on purposes of copyright, dismissing statutory factors as
unhelpful).
40. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:8.5.
41. Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Blanch
v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006)).
42. See PATRY, supra note 12, §10:5.
43. Leval, supra note 23, at 1111.
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of the fair use inquiry.”44 The “central purpose” in analyzing the first
factor is to determine “whether and to what extent the new work is
transformative.”45
A transformative work does not attempt to supersede the original
work, but instead “adds something new, with a further purpose or dif-
ferent character, altering the purpose with new expression, meaning,
or message.”46 In other words, a transformative use “does something
more than repackage or republish the original copyrighted work.”47
The now widely-used “transformative” metaphor was originally
coined by Justice Leval in his Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. opin-
ion, as “a suggestive symbol for a complex thought, and does not
mean that any and all changes made to an author’s original text will
necessarily support a finding of fair use.”48 Following this logic, the
Campbell Court concluded that although “transformative use is not
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright,
to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation
of transformative works.”49 Moreover, Campbell set the precedent
that a use can copy the original work verbatim and still be transforma-
tive if “defendant is communicating a different message or is using the
original for a different purpose.”50 Thus, a transformative work in-
volves: “(1) an alteration of the authorial content; (2) no change in the
form of the original, but a use that performs a valuable purpose; or (3)
no change or alteration, but rather the presentation of the original
intact in a new context or with new insights or a different message.”51
A court’s finding that a work is transformative weighs heavily in
favor of an overall finding of fair use because the “more transforma-
tive the new work is, the less significant are other factors, like com-
mercialism.”52 The reference to commercialism in the final clause of
the first factor is often misinterpreted by courts to focus the factor “as
an inquiry into commerciality or lack thereof,” or a “judgment by
Congress that commercial uses. . .are to receive unfavorable treat-
ment.”53 In reality, according to the 1976 House Judiciary Committee
report, the addition of the clause was merely “intended to illustrate
44. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 41, 45 (quoting On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246
F.3d 152, 171 (2d Cir. 2001)); PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:13.
45. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
46. Id.
47. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 42 (quoting Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathi-
Trust, 755 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2014)).
48. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:1.60 (quoting Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015)).
49. Campbell, 501 U.S. at 579 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 445, n. 40 (1984)).
50. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:21.
51. Id.
52. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
53. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:15.
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types of uses that may, depending upon the facts, be taken into ac-
count in evaluating the actual thrust of the factor.”54
1. Favor for Criticism and Comment
Although, the list of possible fair uses in the preamble to Section
107 is not exhaustive, works that fall into one or more of the six cate-
gories often possess a purpose or character indicative of fair use.55 For
this reason, in analyzing the first factor, courts may begin by looking
to whether the use fits into any of those categories.56 In particular,
courts describe criticism and comment as “[a]mong the best recog-
nized justifications for copying from another’s work.”57
Courts routinely consider parody as a form of criticism and com-
ment because “[t]he critical element of a parody is its comment.”58
The courts should allow parody under the fair use doctrine for its so-
cial benefit of “shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process,
creating a new one.”59 The Second Circuit has also commented that
“in today’s world of often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should
be hospitable to the humor of parody.”60
Depending on the facts, courts may treat reaction videos as paro-
dies, but have generally found that using the copyrighted work is for
the purpose of criticism and comment.61 Though the Hosseinzadeh
court did not decide whether the reaction video format employed by
the Kleins (and, perhaps most famously, by the Fine Brothers) consti-
tuted a work of parody, choosing to refer to the Klein video as “criti-
cal commentary on a creative video,” the court cited several parody
cases to support its decision.62 Thus, finding the Klein video was a
work of criticism, the Hosseinzadeh court held that the first factor
weighed heavily in favor of fair use because “[w]here the defendants’
use is for the purposes of criticism [or] comment. . .factor one will
54. Id. at 2.
55. Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing TCA
Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 179 (2d Cir. 2016)).
56. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
57. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc, 804 F.3d 202, 214-15 (2d Cir. 2015).
58. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:95.
59. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
60. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 623 F.3d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (per
curiam).
61. See Equals Three, LLC v. Jukin Media, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1104–1105
(C.D. Cal. 2015) (“It is difficult to say whether Equals Three’s episodes, which undis-
putedly use graphics and narration to tell jokes about the events depicted in the
videos, criticize these videos – which were themselves made to serve the purpose of
humor and entertainment – or simply point out their inherent humor. Nevertheless,
even if Equals Three’s episodes are not parodies, the episodes comment upon or criti-
cize Jukin’s videos.”); See also Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 45-46 (S.D.
N.Y. 2017).
62. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 39–40.
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normally tilt in the defendants’ favor.”63 Indeed, it asserted, “courts
have regularly found fair use after holding that the purpose or charac-
ter of an allegedly infringing work was criticism [or] comment.”64
2. The Transformative Value of Reaction Videos
As asserted by the Hosseinzadeh court, not all reaction videos con-
stitute fair use.65 However, the court did imply that the format that is
arguably the most popular—the one employed by both the Kleins and
the Fine Brothers, which intersperses clips of another’s work along
with their own (or another person’s) commentary (hereinafter the
“critical reaction video”)—may be considered as a parody, which “has
an obvious claim to transformative value.”66 The Campbell Court was
the first case in which the Supreme Court decided whether parody was
fair use.67 Campbell defined parody as a “literary or artistic work that
imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect
or ridicule,” or “a composition in prose or verse in which the charac-
teristic turns of thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are
imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous.”68 Thus,
parody requires using another’s work for its very existence.
The critical reaction video embodies parody by directly displaying
clips of another’s video, then transform them it into a new work with
the added commentary. For example, these videos can change a
work’s context—without changing its content—and create comedy
even though the original work was not intended to be humorous. This
effectively changes the original work’s purpose. For example, the Hos-
seinzadeh court held that “The Big, The BOLD, The Beautiful” is
transformative because it “responds to and transforms [Hos-
seinzadeh’s] video from a skit into fodder for caustic, moment-by-mo-
ment commentary and mockery.”69 Where “Bold Guy vs. Parkour
Girl” was created to show off the creator’s supposed athletic ability
and sexual prowess, “The Big, The BOLD, The Beautiful” was cre-
ated as a humorous response to the original’s arrogance. Whether
such commentary is tasteful is irrelevant, as the Supreme Court stated,
“[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work],
63. Id. at 42 (quoting NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir.
2004)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 40, n.1.
66. Id. at 42 (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., 156 F.
Supp. 3d 425, 444–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)).
67. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (noting that
prior to Campbell it was only considered once before in Benny v. Loew’s Inc., for
which the court issued no opinion because of its equal division).
68. Id. at 580.
69. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 47.
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outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”70 Of course, not all
parody constitutes fair use; it must be discussed among all other rele-
vant factors for a court to make the determination.71 Further, critical
reaction videos do not require parody or a comedic purpose to trans-
form an original work; critical commentary itself is transformative. .72
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The purpose of the second factor is to “[call] for recognition that
some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection
than others,” and a work that “is in the nature of an artistic crea-
tion. . .falls close to that core.”73 However, this second factor is “rarely
determinative” in a fair use inquiry.74 In general, a court’s determina-
tion that the original work allegedly infringed upon an artistic creation
would weigh against a finding of fair use.75 However, in nearly all fair
use cases involving published works, “[this] factor typically receives
little attention.”76 When determining fair use in critical reaction
videos, courts should continue deemphasizing the second factor be-
cause nearly all works that evoke criticism or commentary are crea-
tive; and like parodies, critical reaction videos “almost invariably copy
publicly known, expressive works.”77 The Hosseinzadeh court held
that the second factor weighed against a finding a fair use because the
original video “was a creative work in that it was entirely scripted and
fictional,” and the court’s judgment in favor of the defendants empha-
sized that this factor is of little value when analyzing a critical reaction
video.78
C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in Relation
to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole
The third factor derives from the Folsom court’s “quantity and
value of the materials used” analysis.79 While “amount” obviously re-
fers to the quantity of the copyrighted work used, “substantiality” re-
fers to “how well tailored that use was to the allegedly infringing
work’s proper purpose.”80 All works of parody are required to “take
recognizable material from the original in order to convey its mes-
70. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
71. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 579–80.
72. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (citing TCA Television Corp. v. McCol-
lum, 839 F.3d 168, 185 (2d Cir. 2016)).
73. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 42 (quoting On Davis, 246 F.3d at 174).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:138.
77. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 570 (1994).
78. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
79. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:138.
80. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
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sage.”81 For criticism and comment in general, “there is an inherent
relationship between the amount copied and the amount of criticism
or comment,” and therefore “[a] work consisting of considerable com-
mentary with fragments from the original interspersed is likely to
qualify” as fair use.82
The nature of the critical reaction video calls for a substantial
amount of copying of the original work to achieve its purpose of criti-
cism and comment. For the Klein video in particular, the Hos-
seinzadeh court held that “[w]ithout using actual clips, the
commentary and critique here would lose context and utility.”83 Re-
gardless, the court held that the third factor was neutral in this case,
even though a large amount of the original work was copied, “such
copying was plainly necessary to the commentary and critique.”84 In
doing so, the court failed to correctly apply the third factor of Section
107. When a substantial portion of the original work is copied verba-
tim, consideration should turn on the persuasiveness of the justifica-
tion for the copying.85 It would have been more appropriate for the
court to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that “the amount per-
mitted to be taken should depend on various factors, among them ‘the
degree of public recognition of the original work, the ease of conjur-
ing up the original work in the chosen medium, and the focus of the
[new work].’”86 In the Hosseinzadeh case, the original work was not
particularly popular with the public or with Kleins’ demographic. As
stated before, the critical reaction video format uses short clips to
“conjure up” the original work. The focus of this format is the criti-
cism and comment of the original work. Had the Hosseinzadeh court
correctly interpreted the third factor based on legislative intent, it
would have held that the third factor weighed in favor of fair use.
D. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value
of the Copyrighted Work
The fourth and final factor in the fair use analysis comes from Fol-
som’s “degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”87 Courts heav-
ily emphasize this factor because it plays an important role in ensuring
the purpose of the fair use doctrine.88 When copying another’s work
interferes with the market for the original, there is no societal bene-
81. Id.
82. PATRY, supra note 12 § 10:61.
83. Hosseinzadeh, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
84. Id.
85. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
86. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:99 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
87. PATRY, supra note 12, §10:7.
88. PATRY, supra note 12, §10:1.60.
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fit.89 However, it is very unlikely that a critical reaction video would
substantially affect the market of the original work enough to pre-
clude a finding of fair use. In assessing the fourth factor, courts are
only concerned with uses that effectively usurp the market for original
work by superseding or “offer[ing] a substitute for the original.”90 It is
not enough for the new work to merely harm the market for the origi-
nal work.91 If this were the case, copyright law would censor any kind
of negative reviews of another work, which must cite the original work
to be effective because the ability to freely criticize or comment on the
works of others would be threatened. With these considerations in
mind, the Campbell Court noted, “[w]hen a lethal parody, like a scath-
ing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a
harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”92 Campbell set the prece-
dent for weighing the fourth factor in the case of a parody, declaring
that “the role of the courts is to distinguish between biting criticism
that merely suppresses demand and copyright infringement, which
usurps it.”93 Courts have held that even parody created for the very
purpose of knocking the original book off the bestseller lists does not
“necessarily harm to the market under the fourth factor if a genuine
parody is involved.”94 The Supreme Court also established in Camp-
bell that when the parody is a “parody pure and simple,” meaning that
it has “nothing but a critical aspect,” it is treated by courts in the same
way as any work of criticism, for which the law does not recognize any
derivative market.95 Therefore, even if the purpose of a critical reac-
tion video is to reduce the popularity or prestige of the original video,
the fourth factor would not weigh against a finding of fair use. Origi-
nal works and their parodies (or critical commentaries) serve different
market functions and therefore exist in separate markets; it is highly
unlikely that the creator of an original work would license a criticism
or parody of their own work.96
In Hosseinzadeh, the court held that the fourth factor weighed in
favor of fair use because “the Klein video does not ‘offer a substitute
for the original,’ it does not (and indeed, cannot) ‘usurp a market that
properly belongs to the copyright-holder.’”97 The Hosseinzadeh
court’s holding found that a critical reaction video, like the one in that
case, qualified as a work of criticism that did present a market issue.
89. Id.
90. Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
91. Id.
92. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994).
93. Id. at 592 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)).
94. PATRY, supra note 12, § 10:100 (citing CCA and B v. F + W Media, 2011 WL
4583790 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2011)).
95. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
96. Id. at 593.
97. Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the Hosseinzadeh court correctly ruled that reaction
videos were not categorically fair use, the critical reaction video de-
scribed herein is a format designed to use the work of another in a
transformative way without infringing on the original creator’s copy-
right.98 Should similar cases arise in the future, courts should look to
the Hosseinzadeh opinion for guidance in light of the purpose of copy-
right. Alleging copyright infringement to prevent the publication of a
critical commentary of one’s own work would set a dangerous prece-
dent. The criticism of another’s work, without some kind of incorpora-
tion of the original work, would likely be ineffective. The gradual
censoring of such criticism using the threat of civil action would eradi-
cate many important contributions to our culture. Even if the criticism
is published wholly for comedic purposes, the therapeutic value of the
work serves as a social benefit and supports the legislators’ intention
in establishing copyright law.99 Though the critical reaction video for-
mat may not be universally loved or revered for its artistic value, it
nonetheless contributes to society just as any other creative work
would. Their publication does not deserve to be limited any more than
the publication of a critical book review that uses quotes from the
book for reference. In 2018, critical reaction videos remain a popular
format for creators and viewers alike, and whether that changes
should depend on the natural ebb and flow of popular culture—not on
their creators’ fear of copyright infringement lawsuits.
98. Id. at 40, n.1.
99. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR306.txt unknown Seq: 14 15-APR-19 14:28
